

Nietzsche: Science and Truth

Danny Smith

This paper uses some of Lacan's concepts to discuss a number of questions regarding Nietzsche's writings on the problem of science, particularly focusing on the relationship between science and truth. Nietzsche's position, it is argued, is a deeply paradoxical one, entailing both a strong antirealism (Nietzsche takes all scientific statements to be 'false'), and an understanding that the scientific discourse nevertheless has massive and undeniable consequences in the real world. How is it possible to bring together these two seemingly incompatible views? Nietzsche himself does not provide us with a detailed resolution of this problem, but, it is suggested, Lacan also holds this same position, and *does* provide us with a formal answer to this problem. Rather than following what Lacan would call a 'male' reading of Nietzsche's position, in which his theory of truth provides us with a 'meta'-perspective, it is argued that Nietzsche ought to be read according to the 'feminine' side of Lacan's formulas. Rather than taking scientific statements to be 'false' because they do not perfectly capture whatever ultimately *is* true, Nietzsche and Lacan instead question the idea that truth itself is something 'out there' in a fully constituted state, waiting to be 'captured' by the scientific discourse. Instead, they both argue for a picture of reality as 'not-whole', as constitutively incomplete, which in turn allows them to explain how it is that the 'false' scientific discourse nonetheless succeeds in creating its 'real' object.

Arqueología: arte, historia, antropología.

Análisis filosófico de la génesis y desarrollo de una disciplina

Anna Estany

Este artículo se sitúa en el campo de la filosofía de la arqueología o meta-arqueología. El objetivo es el análisis de los principales cambios ocurridos en la arqueología en su constitución como disciplina científica. Para ello vamos a centrarnos, en primer lugar, en la evolución de la arqueología desde la etapa de los anticuarios hasta su constitución como ciencia social pasando por la etapa histórica; en segundo lugar, vamos a examinar el cambio que supuso el paso de la arqueología tradicional a la llamada "Nueva Arqueología" o arqueología procesal surgida en la década de los sesenta, y, finalmente, analizaremos el surgimiento de la arqueología post-procesual, haciendo un balance de la controversia entre los dos enfoques.

Lo que intento defender en este trabajo es que el paso de la arqueología tradicional a la Nueva Arqueología fue un cambio que podemos llamar "revolución metodológica" y que, por tanto, dicho enfoque no ha fracasado a menos que estemos dispuestos a renunciar al estudio sistemático y científico del pasado. Por tanto, la arqueología post-procesual no constituye un nuevo paradigma que pueda sustituir la Nueva Arqueología.

Freud, a concepção do descentramento e a Física Moderna

Lino Machado

A noção filosófica de descentramento é oriunda de textos de Sigmund Freud de 1916-17, baseando-se na física, na biologia e estendendo-se à psicanálise; todavia, os “golpes cosmológico”, “biológico” e “psicológico” no narcisismo humano, que ele atribuiu respectivamente a Copérnico, à dupla Darwin-Wallace e à psicanálise (vale dizer, ao próprio Freud), precisam ser revistos, pois o primeiro se sustenta numa cosmologia apenas tridimensional (copernicana e não quadridimensional-relativística), o segundo, numa visão biológica ainda sem mecanismos quânticos, que, aos poucos, estão sendo descobertos, e o terceiro, numa concepção da psique que a isola demais do universo. Ao invés de um descentramento freudiano do sujeito, precisamos pensar num *modelo multicentrado* (quadridimensional) da existência como um todo, nisto incluída a subjetividade, sem retroagir a concepções da psique ultrapassadas por Freud e seus seguidores. As argumentações sobre o descentramento de Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan e Jacques Derrida (sobretudo o último, que explicitou o termo) também são examinadas no artigo.

Understanding Admissibility

George Masterton

Lewis' concept of admissibility was introduced as an integral part of his famous Principal Principle; the principle that initial rational/reasonable belief should conform to objective chance unless there is evidence to the contrary. At that time Lewis offered only the rough and ready characterization that evidence not to the contrary of such dependence is admissible. This, together with some sufficiency conditions, served well enough until it became clear that admissibility was central to debates on the viability of Humean Supervenience and the analysis of objective chance. In response, Thau and Lewis refined the concept of admissibility in various ways. Since the mid 90's those who have employed the concept have, with minor variations and additions, followed the Thau/Lewis line. Yet, in the 30 years since its introduction what has been all too conspicuous by its absence is a full formal definition of admissibility and its degrees. Herein a family of definitions – all in terms of screening off by chance – that capture much that has been agreed about admissibility are proposed and evaluated; one of which is ultimately found to be serviceable as a definition schema for relative admissibility and its degrees.

Truth and Historicism in Kuhn's Thesis of Methodological Incommensurability

Marco Marletta

Methodological incommensurability is a Thomas Kuhn's thesis affirming that there are no shared, objective methodological rules or neutral scientific standards for theory comparison and choice. This thesis has often been interpreted as a relativistic and irrationalist claim on the incomparability of scientific theories. Since every paradigm refers to its standards, problem-field and aims, theory choice is subjective and arbitrary. Moreover it seems that, in his latest works, Kuhn abandons this aspect of incommensurability to focus on semantic incommensurability. On the contrary I will argue against the interpretation of methodological incommensurability as a source of epistemological relativism. The relativistic feature of incommensurability, rather, must be looked for in Kuhn's skepticism on the concept of truth as correspondence. From this point of view methodological incommensurability is consistent with semantic incommensurability, because they are both rooted in the intra-theoretical nature of truth. According to Kuhn, incommensurability and truth are historical concepts. The rational explanation of scientific conviction change cannot aim to something above the historical situation and the concrete scientific practice (such as the correspondence between theory and reality): truth is not correspondence, but an historical function of scientific community's agreement. We can evaluate the accuracy, fruitfulness, consistency, scope or simplicity of a theory and make a rational decision; but none of these parameters can measure the theory likeness to truth. Theory choice is always a theory-theory match, not a theory- reality match.

Are Colors Real?

Emiliano Boccardi

In this paper I argue that the properties that we represent in our color experiences should best be thought of as relational properties of physical objects and perceptual apparatuses. In particular, I argue that color properties are the (physical) properties that instantiate the operators that projects the infinite-dimensional space of spectral reflectances onto the finite color spaces that organisms perceive. Colors, under this account, are objective, mind-independent (albeit relational) properties of the world.